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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CASE NO. 900233-CA 
GALEN CHRJSTENSEN, : BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
MACK A. MtJNNS, GREGORY C. 
MARBLE, DfiE M. MARBLE, BOYD 
MARBLE, RANDY MARBLE, and 
CHERYL MARBLE, 
defendants/Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from a Judgement entered against the 
Defendants/Appellants in the First Judicial District Court in and 
for Box Elder County, State of Utah. The Judgment against the 
Defendants/Appellants was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court 
i 
pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(j) of Utah Code Ann. 1953 Amended and was 
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) 
Utah Code Ann. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the First Judicial 
District Court in and for Box Elder County, State of Utah by the 
Honorable F. L. Gunnell, District Court Judge, granting judgment 
on a promissory note for the Plaintiff/Respondent, Galen 
Christens^n, against the Defendants/Appellants, Mack A. Munns, 
Gregory C« Marble, Dee M. Marble, Boyd Marble, Randy Marble and 
Cheryl Marble. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial Judge correctly ruled that the 
promissory note provided for compound interest. 
2. Whether Plaintiff/Respondent•s attorney's statements 
under oath supporting his hours for attorney fees was sufficient 
to award attorney fees. 
3. Whether the delivery and use of the trailer by the 
Plaintiff/Respondent was enough consideration for the promissory 
note and whether consideration was in fact necessary to enforce the 
promissory note. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-104(1): 
"Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this 
chapter must: 
a. be signed by the maker or drawer; and 
b. contain an unconditional promise or order 
to pay a sum certain in money and no 
other promise, order, obligation or power 
given by the maker or drawer except as 
authorized by this chapter; and 
c. be payable on demand or on a definite 
time; and 
d. be payable to orderer or to bearer." 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Plaintiff/Respondent, Galen Christensen, filed a lawsuit 
in the First Judicial District Court in and for Box Elder County, 
State of Utah to collect $8,200.00 which Defendants/Appellants 
agreed to pay pursuant to a promissory note that was signed on 
March 26, 1981. A non-jury trial was held and the Honorable F. L. 
Gunnell, District Court Judge, rendered judgment in favor of the 
-2-
Plaintiff/Respondent in the amount of $5,194.93, plus attorney fees 
of $800.00, filing fees of $75.00 for a total judgment of 
$6,069.93. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 26, 1981, the Plaintiff/Respondent entered into a 
contract with the Defendants/Appellants for the sale of a 1978 
Fruehauf Semi-Trailer (T.8). The terms of the contract, as 
witnessed by a promissory note, were that the Defendants/Appellants 
were to pay the Plaintiff/Respondent a total of $12,200.00 (T.10). 
Defendants/Appellants were to pay $4,000,000 as a down payment, 
$3,000.00 on August 15, 1981 and the balance due, plus interest, 
on October 15, 1981 (T.10). Interest was to be computed at prime 
I 
plus three percent (3%) (T.ll). Defendants/Appellants paid 
$4,000.00 down on March 26, 1981, $3,000.00 on September 4, 1981, 
$1,500.00 on July 27, 1983, $1,500.00 on October 12, 1983, and 
$1,153.60 on July 12, 1984 (T.ll). The 1978 Fruehauf Semi-Trailer 
was delivered to Defendants/Appellants by Plaintiff/Respondent on 
receipt of the down payment and signing of the promissory note on 
I 
March 26, 1981 (T.8). Since July 12, 1984, Defendants/Appellants 
have failed to make any additional payments as agreed to under the 
terms of the promissory note (T.ll.). Further, one of the 
Defendants/Appellants, Boyd F. Marble, testified that he did not 
expect the title until the parties came to some type of final 
agreement (T.4 3). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial Judge was correct in his factual findings that 
compound interest is allowed in this case. The parties signed a 
promissory note that stated interest would be due on a day certain, 
to wit, October 15, 1981. Case law provides that if a person 
promises to pay interest at a certain time then compound interest 
is proper. 
The Plaintiff/Respondent delivered the 1978 Fruehauf Semi-
Trailer to the Defendants/Appellants on the day the promissory note 
was signed and their use of the trailer from 1981 forward is 
sufficient consideration for the promissory note. Further, Utah 
law clearly states that no consideration is necessary for 
enforcement of a negotiable instrument such as a promissory note. 
Last, the Judge was correct in awarding attorney fees, the 
Defendants/Appellants have not met their burden of proof on appeal 
to overturn the awarding of attorney fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN INCLUDING COMPOUND INTEREST 
IN ITS JUDGMENT. 
The Defendant's/Appellant's main point on appeal is that the 
trial Court was wrong in awarding compound interest. It is true 
that the courts have not generally favored an award of compound 
interest unless the written documents clearly provide for it. 
However, in the present case there is no question but that the 
promissory note specifically allowed for compound interest. The 
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interest on the promissory note was to be paid at a date certain, 
October 15, 1981 (T.10) . Due to the fact that the interest was not 
paid on that date, the Plaintiff/Respondent is entitled to collect 
interest on the monies he did not receive including the interest 
due October 15, 1981-
Before delving further into the specifics of the argument, the 
Plaintiff/Respondent would respectfully point out to the Court that 
the trial court entered a Finding of Facto The Finding of Fact was 
that the parties agreed to compound interest, the exact terms of 
which were to be worked out by the parties * In order to challenge 
the trial courtfs Finding of Fact, the Defendants/Appellants must 
demonstrate that despite the Court's ruling and the evidence, its 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. See 
Bartell 776 P.2d 885, 886 (1989). 
There is no showing of the evidence in Defendant's/Appellant!s 
brief to show that the trial court was erroneous. On the contrary, 
the trial court was right. In a recent Utah Supreme Court 
decision, one of the issues brought up on appeal was whether or not 
compound interest was proper. The decision allowed compound 
interest when there is a promise to pay interest at a particular 
time. The Court, in their decision (See Watkins and Faber v. 
Whiteley 592 P.2d 613, 616, [Utah 1979]) stated: 
"The Plaintiff relies upon the case of Jensen v. 
Lichtenstein as authority for permitting compound 
interest. That case is not a point. There the Defendant 
promised to pay interest at specified times and this 
court held that when the specified date arrived there was 
a new debt, to wit, the promised interest in additional 
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to the original debt. In the instant matter there was 
no promise to pay interest at a particular time (616)." 
(emphasis added) 
Thus, the Supreme Court makes it very clear that where the 
Defendant promised to pay interest at a specified time, the court 
will allow compound interest. The case is right in point. The 
Plaintiff/Respondent and Defendants/Appellants entered into a 
promissory note. The promissory note specifically provided that 
all interest would be due on October 15, 1981. No interest was 
paid. Therefore, the Plaintiff/Respondent is entitled to receive 
interest on his interest. The fact that the Defendants/Appellants 
promised to pay interest on October 15, 1981, created a new debt. 
Because interest was not paid and as stated by the Court, the 
Plaintiff/Respondent is entitled to receive interest on his 
interest. 
There is another Supreme Court case that also speaks about 
compound interest. In Farnsworth v. Jenson 217 P. 2d 571 (Utah 
1950) the Court stated: 
"This brings us to the method of computing the interest. 
The provision in the contract provided for the payment 
of interest at the rate of 6% per annum for each yearly 
payment was to include the amount of this interest. 
Accordingly, there became due annually from the 
Respondents the sum of $312.00 as interest. We believe 
the rule announced in Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 
320, 145 P. 1036, 1041, is controlling. In that case, 
Mr. Justice Frick, speaking for the Court, disposed of 
the computation of interest in the following language: 
""Defendant1 s have promised to pay the 
interest quarterly. Thus fell due at the end 
of each quarter, the sum of $175,00 as 
interest. This amount was owing from 
Defendants to the Plaintiff at the end of each 
quarter after the 6th day of December, 1910, 
when the last interest was paid as found by 
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the court. If Defendants had paid Plaintiff 
the interest when due, he could have re-loaned 
it to them or he could have loaned it to 
anyone else, and then could have contracted 
for any rate of interest not exceeding 12% per 
annum. . . ."" 
The Plaintiff, therefore, was as much entitled to 
interest upon the unpaid interest as though it had been 
paid to him when due and he had re-loaned it* . . ." 
Thus, it is very clear from Utah law that when a party states a day 
certain when the interest is due, they are entitled to interest 
from that day forward. The Defendants/Appellants promised to pay 
the balance of the contract plus interest on October 15, 1981. The 
Defendants/Appellants failed to meet that obligation. Due to the 
fact that Defendants/Appellants failed to meet that obligation, the 
Plaintiff/Respondent is entitled to interest on that interest or, 
in other words, compound interest from that day forward. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT DID NOT NEED TO HAVE 
CONSIDERATION TO SUPPORT THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE, HOWEVER, PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT DID 
DELIVER THE TRAILER TO THE DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS FOR 
THEIR USE WHICH WOULD BE AMPLE CONSIDERATION. 
The Plaintiff/Respondent argues in his brief that the 
Defendants/Appellants refused to provide any consideration. Utah 
law, more specifically the Uniform Commercial Code, specifically 
states that no consideration is necessary to enforce a promissory 
note. Section 78-3-104(1) states: 
"Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this 
chapter must: 
a. be signed by^  the maker or drawer; and 
b. contain an unconditional promise or order 
to pay a sum certain in money and no 
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other promise, order, obligation or power 
given by the maker or drawer except as 
authorized by this chapter; and 
c. be payable on demand or on a definite 
time; and 
d. be payable to orderer or to bearer." 
Thus, it is clear under Utah law that a negotiable instrument needs 
to meet four requirements• The four requirements are outlined as 
a, b, c, and d above. There is nothing about consideration. 
Defendants/Appellants argument that no consideration was tendered, 
first of all, is without merit on the basis that no consideration 
is needed. 
However, if the court finds that consideration was needed, it 
is clear that consideration was in fact given. Black's Law 
Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition 1968 defines consideration as: 
"Any benefit conferred, or agreed to be conferred, upon 
the promisor, by any other person, to which the promisor 
is not lawfully entitled. . ." 
The Defendants/Appellants received a 1978 Fruehauf Semi-
Trailer. They were not legally entitled to the trailer. The fact 
that they took the trailer on March 26, 1981 (T.8), when they had 
no legal right to the trailer and were not lawfully entitled to the 
trailer is enough to support the fact that consideration was given. 
POINT III 
THE JUDGE'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES WAS PROPER UNDER 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The Defendants/Appellants raise the issue that attorney fees 
were not based on sufficient evidence. The attorney for the 
Plaintiff/Respondent called himself as a witness and testified as 
to attorney fees (T.23). Further, the allegation by the 
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Defendants/Appellants simply stating that attorney fees are not 
supported by the evidence is not sufficient. There is no reference 
to case law or statutory law or any basis for the objection. It 
is a well established principle of law in this court and other Utah 
courts that a review of the evidence by an appellant court is 
construed so that any review or any inferences from a review is 
done in the light most favorable to the finder of fact. State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). Further, the courts have 
repeatedly stated that a judgment cannot and will not be reversed 
unless the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds have entertained a reasonable doubt. State 
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443f 444 (Utah 1983). Keeping in mind this 
burden and standard of law, makes it clear that the 
Defendants/Appellants have not met their burden. The attorney for 
the Plaintiff/Respondent testified under oath as to what he charged 
in the matter. He testified and requested more than what the Judge 
awarded. The Judge is the trier of the facts and he makes the 
decision as to whether or not those services are reasonable based 
on the testimony presented to him. The Judge decided to award less 
attorney fees than requested. The Judge, based on the facts, made 
his decision and no evidence or authority has been sided to 
contradict that finding. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff/Respondent respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm the lower Court's judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this I day of November, 1990, 
VANDERLI 
fEN C. VANEMERLIN&EN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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